Clausewitz in the 21st Century

Cla officewitz lived in a time where battles were fought in columns and lines, with soldiers using muskets and solid-shot potnon when states were the exclusive actors in scrape when technological miscellanea occurred over decades, if not centuries. What relevancy could his work therefore realise for the strategic problems of the twenty-first nose candy? Introduction Clausewitz was not a cook give-and-take writer. He was not looking for hard and agile rules for conducting fight, which he eschews.Indeed, Clausewitzian theories elaborated at various periods of time be in close conjunction with the paramount insurance policy-making, strategic, and armament context, which is completely consonant with Clausewitzs original idealion of his profess work Theory should be study, not doctrine It is an analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the capacity use to experience in our crusade, to army history it leads to thorough familiarity with it.The close r it comes to that remnant, the more it proceeds from the objective constitute of a science to a subjective form of a skill, the more effective it bequeath produce in atomic number 18as where the character of the case admits no arbiter but talent. Theory is meant to educate the mind of the proximo air force officer, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield. If the absurd variance among theory and employment is to be contained, then the correspondence between theory and practice implies the correspondence between the military commander and military thinker.Therefore, self-education is important and useful to the military thinker too. He must not be bounded by a single theory of state of state of state of contend but with the means to develop his own ideas (objective knowledge of war), fuelled by his talent (subjective capacity and application). The phenomena of war argon more diverse than ever from terrorism to inter-state war, from in make-up war to riots in rural aras, from air strikes to intifada. Loose ne 2rks of limited wars have replaced the expectation of a nuclear apocalypse that characterized the Cold war.The differences and contradictions between the various conclusions and corresponding analyses regarding a strategic situation be but a reflection of the variety of military fights and the diversity of perspectives from which these involutions be ob helpd. These perspectives depend on time, culture, and policy-making context. This phenomenon has been analyzed through the design of strategic culture, that is a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, harbors and habits regarding the bane and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as the geographical setting, history and governmental culture.States (e. g. Americans, Europeans, Chinese, Iranians, Indians etc. ) tend to have polar perspectives on strategic problems, and the reason for these di vergences probably goes beyond the defense of short-term interests. The extremely heterogeneous situation of the phenomena of war is analyzed from very different lenses of different strategic cultures, and hence makes states theories of war difficult to critique. Moreover, it is difficult to validate the doctrines that reflect these different theories by the use of examples of ope cerebral success or failure.Therefore, the need for a theory-of-theories of war remains valid. An overarching theory of war will take into ac enumerate the influence of the interaction between the thinker and his object and can form the mannikin required to analyze the strategic debate. Clausewitz gum olibanum continues to remain relevant to analyze strategic problems of the 21st century as he had developed a theory about the theory of war. Research ApproachClausewitz recognized that catnap had overreached himself and the theoretical significance that a consistent, single military strategy could have di fferent historical outcomes. In his own credit evident in his tint of 1827 that any theory of war had to accommodate two sorts of war war to overthrow the enemy and war that is the basis of negotiation with him. Four fundamental contrasts are emphasized between the early and by and by Clausewitz because they remain primal to contemporary debates about his work (1) The primacy of military force versus the primacy of government activity. 2) Existential warfare, or quite an warfare touchd to whizzs own identity, which set-aside(p) Clausewitz most strongly in his early years, as against the instrumental view of war that prevails in his later(prenominal) work. (3) The pursuit of military success through eternal rage embodying the principle of destruction, versus the primacy of limited war and the restriction of violence in war, which loomed increasingly large in Clausewitzs later years. (4) The primacy of defense as the stronger form of war, versus the promise of decisive results that was embodied in the seizure of offensive initiative.It is not the intent or purpose of this paper to summarize Clausewitzs works, given its scope, or to challenge the assertions of specific anti-Clausewitz writers such as Martin van Crevald, John Keegan or yet Alvin and Heidi Toffler. The paper will instead highlight the seeming unbounded-ness of war (or armed conflict) and violence in the twenty-first century, and propose a strategy of containment of war and violence. This will relate later Clausewitzs concepts of war and governance to our current reality. At the outset, I will provide an outline of Clausewitzs concept of the nature of war.Additionally, given the research questions implication that Clausewitz should be apart(p) due to his lack of regard for non-state actors and that his writings were in a time of slow technological change, I will also demonstrate that Clausewitz was well-aware of the influence of non-state actors and their ability to wage war and h is thoughts has continued relevance in our time of rapid technological changes. The Nature of War For Clausewitz, war was likened to a chameleon, allowing for changes to its appearance, but suggesting that its inherent nature remains unchanged.The character of war has certainly changed or morphed since his time. His critics argue that some changes can deviate wars very nature, and the nature of war today is radically different from the nature of war then, the age of Napoleon. In other words, the changes are more fundamental than can plainly be accounted by shifting characteristics. The most recent English translation of the text, by Michael Howard and Peter Parat, renders its opening sentence thus War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a essence phenomenon its dominant tendencies al bureaus make war a remarkable tierce. Clearly, a chameleon remains a chameleon whatever color it dramatises for the time being. The crucial two words in the translation are more than, which imply that the circumstances of war can cause war to change more than its characteristics War in other words is not like a chameleon. However, this translation did not capture the ghost of Clausewitzs original Der Krieg ist also nicht nu rein wahres Chamaleon, weil er in jedem konkreten Fall seine Natur etwas andert, sondern er ist auch seinem Gesamterscheinungen nach, in Beziehung auf die in ihm herrschenden Tendenzen, eine wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit.The implication here is that war may indeed be a chameleon, in that it changes its nature slightly in each individual case (its character), but not its nature in general, which is made up of the trinity (addressed later). The translation thus reads War is not only a true chameleon, because it changes its nature slightly in each concrete case, but it also, in it is overall appearance, in relation to its inherent tendencies, a wondrous trinity. The Primacy of form _or_ system of governm ent and the Trinity War is an instrument of policy. It is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. Clausewtizs aphorism on the family relationship between war and policy was now being dismissed not because war had no utility-grade but because it is being waged for reasons that are not political or policy-driven. Critics argue that Clausewitz no longer have a place in the current strategic and security studies debates, where war was no longer the body politic of armed forces but also of non-state actors.The question was whether strategy, traditionally-defined, continues to be the best way of looking at what was, revealingly, no longer however called war, but armed conflict. Clausewitz understood a community as having its own political and social identity, even if it lacked statehood. much(prenominal) an interpretation is consonant with Clausewitzs own interest in wars in the beginning 1648, where he specifically linked the weaknesses of states to exceptional manifestations in the art of war.In his review of the history of war, he described the semibarbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth-century as all conducting war in their own special(prenominal) way, using different methods and pursuing different objective lenss. Despite this variability, Clausewitz stresses that war is all these cases remains a continuation of their policy by other means. In doing so, however, he suppresses the difference between the policies of states and the intentions of other communities which wage war.Therefore, it makes mavin to supplement the primacy of policy as a general category with the affiliation of belligerents to a warring community. If the communities are states, we can speak of politics in the modern sense if they are ethnic, religious, or other communities, the value systems and goals of thos e communities (their cultures) are the more important factors. Based on this, we could replace Clausewitzs meaning of state with the vox populi of it being that of the intentions, aims or values of the warring community, thus remaining much more faithful to his collar of what a state embodies.Otherwise, we would implicitly express a modern understanding of Clausewitzs concept of state. Clausewitzs concepts of war (including armed conflict) and violence continue to be relevant so long as they are motivated by interests and policy and not hate, rage, boredom, the need for personal meaning and bonding. Die Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit (The Wondrous Trinity) Clausewitz describes the trinity as composed of (1) Primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are regarded as a blind natural force (2) The renovate of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam and 3) Its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason. Read in tandem with Clausewitzs metaphor of wars appearance from case to case as a chameleon, the trinity addresses the underlying forces that drive those changes. His message was that the relationship among these three elements was inherently unstable and shifting. To quote, the taskis to keep our theory of war floating among these three tendencies, and not try to set, or to count on any fixed relationship among them. Clausewitz and a invigorated ContainmentThe Removal of the Inhibitions on War and a sweet Containment The twenty-first century appeared for a time an age defined by economics and, to a great extent, peace. These expectations quickly disappeared with the massacres and genocides in Africa, return of war to Europe, the 9/11 attacks, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars with their continuing, violent consequences and the Arab Springs. A struggle against a new totalitarianism of an Islamic type appears to have started, in which war and violence is ordinarily perceived as havi ng an unavoidable role, and perceived to be becoming more unbounded than ever before.Spatially, the terrorist are potentially ever present. Temporally, there seems no end-in-sight to their attacks. We face new types of threats such as the development of atomic bombs by problematic states like Iran and North Korea and the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. The emergence of mainland china as a potential super reason and perhaps great powers, like India, may lead to a fresh arms dynamic, with the possibility of a nuclear dimension. Violence seems to be going out of rational control, an image that the media has not hesitated to portray.There is a grave portent of mankind confronting a coming anarchy of alien dimensions. Hence, a new strategy of containment is needed. There is no longer one exclusive actor to be contained. A strategy for military containment of chinaware similar to that used against the Soviet Union in the mid-fifties and 1960s, will likely provo ke all kinds of crises and even conflict, which such a strategy intends to avoid. Therefore, a different concept of containment is needed, one that is not perceived as a threat by China.The second difference is that current developments in the strategic environment display fundamentally conflicting tendencies. A strategy knowing to counter only one of these conflicting tendencies may be problematic with respect to the others. Therefore, there is a need to strike a balance between competing possibilities. The tertiary difference is that the traditional containment was perceived primarily as military disapproverence of the Soviet Union. The new containment must combine traditional, military containment on one side and a range of opportunities for cooperation on the other.That is inevitable with respect not only to China, but even to political Islam, in order to reduce the appeal of militant Islamic movements to millions of Muslim youths. In receipt to this unbounded-ness on war a nd violence, a conception for their containment is needed to provide a sustained and continual limitation through the fencing in and encircling of the same forces. The guiding perspective is that of a peaceful, or rather a pacified, global society. This perspective cannot be equated with peace since in order to reach this goal, non-peaceful, violent and even military means must in some cases be employed.Clausewitzs Concept of government The vote down of Napoleon was the turning point of Clausewitzs theory, where he faced the problem of dealing with strategies of limited war within the same conceptual framework as those leading to total defeat of the enemy. He agnize that there are very different and even contrasting kinds of war and strategy. The conflicting tendencies in war, specially between limited and unlimited war compelled Clausewitz to conclude that the unifying general principle was politics. However, which kind of politics could serve to contain war and violence in the twenty-first century?Clausewitzs notions of limited warfare have their foundations in the last parts of book VIII. They find some reflection in book I, chapter 2 Be that as it may, we must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the purpose of the war has been achieved and further on Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. In book VIII, he stated In this way the belligerent is again driven to adopt a middle course.He would act on the principle of using no greater force, and setting himself no greater military aim, than would be sufficient for the achievement of his political purpose. To turn this principle into practice, he must renounce the need for absolute success in each given case. It is a natural entirely tone to evolve from his strategy of limited warfare to one of the limitations of war and violence as the overarching purpose of political action in the twenty-first century. This perspective is still based on Clausewitzs statement that war is a continuation of politics by other means, while stressful to actualize his concept of politics.Clausewitz describes war on the one hand as a continuation of politics, but on the other side as waged with other than political means. This implicit tension is the basis of the explicit contrast between the first and the third tendencies of Clausewitzs trinity. Furthermore, one could argue that globalization and the ubiquity of information technologies have created a worldwide political space from which no one can escape, however much his actions might be derived, in their quick motivation, from private interests or from the cultural practices of ethnic or tribal communities.Hence, the role of politics is intensified and chemical reaction time within all three tendencies of Clausewitzs trinity is reduced. Containing War and Violence in gentleman Soci ety The concept of containment is associated with the insight that we cannot expect in the foreseeable future to see fully non-violent societies or a non-violent world society. In addition, the aspiration to a world without conflicts as such fails to recognize that in the course of history conflicts and conflict solutions have frequently been necessary for human development.The main task confronting politics and social forces in the twenty-first century is the radical limitation, even diminishing of violence and war, so that non-violent structures can be sustained and the mechanisms of the world of societies can come to fruition. The overall political perspective on which the concept of the containing of war and violence in world society rests therefore consists of the following elements, the pentagon of containing war and violence 1) The ability to deter and discourage any opponent from fighting a large-scale war and to conduct precise military action as a last resort (2) The possi bility of using military force in order to limit and contain particularly excessive, large-scale violence which has the potential to destruct societies (3) The willingness to counter phenomena which armed service to cause violence, such as poverty and oppression, especially in the economic sphere, and also the recognition of a pluralism of cultures and styles of life in world society 4) The motivation to develop a culture of civil conflict management (concepts which can be summed up in the civilizational hexagon, global governance, and democratic peace), based on the note that the reduction of our action to military means has proved counterproductive and in the end will overhaul our military capabilities and (5) Restricting the possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, as well as of small arms, because the proliferation of some(prenominal) is inherently destructive to social order. Antulio Echevarria writes that the U. S.National Stra tegy for Combating Terrorism also let ins an essential, but rather ambitious goal of diminishing the conditions that terrorists typically exploit, such as poverty, social and political disenfranchisement, and long-standing political, religious, and ethnic grievances reducing these conditions requires, among other things, education political, social, and economic development, good governance, the rule of law, and consistent participation in the war of ideas Further important tasks include preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of small arms.Normative criteria are required for the containment of war and violence in world society. Such criteria combine politicalmoral considerations with aspects relevant to every states interest in self-preservation. It requires political actors to recognize the advantages of self-limitation as part of their own enlightened self-interest. In anthropological terms, we can see the roots of the political in the openness and indete rminacy of the human power to act. In historical terms, we can follow Aristotle in beholding these roots in the way we are forced to limit ourselves once we become aware of the hazard of human actions.It follows from this that one of the decisive questions for future development is that of the possible self-interest of the United States, or regional powers, making conflict subject to legal norms, in civil conflict management, and binding military power into alliance systems. President Obamas Pivot to Asia necessitated the development of a military strategy for the potential, if highly improbable, conflict with China. Seeking a decisive victory or traditional military containment are not feasible strategies in current and projected realities, as they probably only serve to escalate the situation.Also, the United States must select ways that minimize the probability of escalation to nuclear conflict simply because it does not understand Chinas nuclear release process and there is n o winner in a study nuclear exchange. The logic leads to the concept of Offshore Control. Operationally, it uses currently available means and restricted ways to abnegate China the use of the sea in a strategy of economic strangulation to exhaust China to the point it seeks war resolution. Penetration into China is forbidden to reduce the possibility of escalation and to make war termination easier.Offshore Control seeks to allow the Chinese Communist Part to end the conflict in the same way China ended its conflicts with India, the UN (in Korea), the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese. It allows China to declare it taught the enemy a lesson and thus end the conflict. The progressive limitation of war and violence indefinitely can be an end to itself in the realization of a basically peaceful global policy. The enduring and progressive containment of war and violence is therefore necessary for self-preservation of states, even their survival, and for the civility of individual societ ies and world society.Conclusion Clausewitz, in his note of 1827, recognized the need to rework the whole of On War according to his new insight, the distinction between limited war and war whose aim is to overthrow the enemy and render him powerless. However, he was not always clear in his thoughts especially in his early writings and even up to 1827. For example, there is a lack of clarity on the hash out at the beginning of book I, chapter 1, of the three interactions that push war to the extreme, despite the fact that these sections were presumably create verbally after the note of 1827.It can be said that for the purpose of analyzing and studying warfare, some(prenominal) the early and later Clausewitz is of great importance and value. However, for political and military action of our time, perhaps only the later Clausewitz needs serve as an important basis. As Clausewitz himself emphasized at the end of his discussion of the trinity, at any rate, the overture concept of wa r casts a first ray of light on the basic structure of theory, and enables us to make an initial differentiation and identification of its major components. Thinking about contemporary and future warfare with, and sometimes beyond, Clausewitz can still be the best way to begin. Bibliography 1. Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Clausewitz and a bare-assed Containment. In S. Hew, H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 283-307). radical York Oxford University constrict Inc. 2. Andreas, H. -R. , Antulio , E. (2007, December 27). Clausewitz in the Twenty First-Century Primacy of Policy and a New Containment. From World Security Network http//www. worldsecuritynetwork. com/showArticle3. cfm? article_id=14985 3. Antulio, E. (1995-1996, Winter).War, Politics and the RMA The Legacy of Clausewitz. Joint Force Quarterly, pp. 76-80. 4. Antulio, E. I. (2003). Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War. The European Legacy, 8/3, pp. 317-32. 5. Clausewitz, C. v. (197 6). On War. In H. Michael, P. Peter, H. Michael, P. Peter (Eds. ). New Jersey Princeton. 6. Durieux, B. (2009). Clausewitz and the Two Temptations of Modern strategical Thinking. In S. Hew, H. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 251- 265). New York Oxford University excite Inc. 7. Hammes, T. (2012, Spring). Offshore Control A Proposed Strategy. Infinity Journal, 2(2), pp. 0-14. 8. Hew, S. , Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Introduction. In S. Hew, H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 1-13). New York Oxford University Press Inc. 9. Antulio, E. (2009). Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror. In S. Hew, H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 196-218). New York Oxford University Press Inc. 10. Ken, B. , R. , T. (1999). Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region. London. 11. Metz, S. (1994). Clausewitz Homepage. From A Wake for Clausewitz Toward a philosophical system of 21st-Century Warfare h ttp//www. lausewitz. com/readings/Metz. htm 12. Sumida, J. (2009). On Defence as the Stronger Form of War. In S. Hew, H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 164-181). New York Oxford University Press Inc. 1 . Durieux, B. (2009). Clausewitz and the Two Temptations of Modern Strategic Thinking. In S. Hew, & H. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 251- 265). New York Oxford University Press Inc. 2 . Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Parat (Princeton, NJ, 1976), II, 2, p. 141. 3 . Ibid. II, 2, p. 141. 4 . Ibid. II, 2, p. 142. 5 . Ken, B. , & R. , T. (1999). Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region. London. 6 . Durieux, B. (2009). Clausewitz and the Two Temptations of Modern Strategic Thinking. In S. Hew, & H. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 251- 265). New York Oxford University Press Inc. 7 . The same principles and strategies that were the decisive foundatio n of Napoleons initial successes at Jena and Auerstedt proved inadequate in the special situation of the Russian campaign and eventually contributed to his final defeat at Waterloo. 8 . Clausewitz or Sun Tzu Paradigms of warfare for the 21st century written by Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 13-Dec-06. WorldSecurityNetwork. com WorldSecurityNetwork. com. http//www. worldsecuritynetwork. com/printArticle3. cfm? article_id=13757 9 . On War, I, 1, 28, P. 89. 10 . Hew, S. , & Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Introduction. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 1-13). New York Oxford University Press Inc. 11 . Vom Kriege, ed. Werner Hahlweg (19th edn, Bonn, 1980), 1, 1, 28, pp. 212-213. 12 . On War, VIII, 6B, p. 610. 13 . Ibid. p. 605. The phrase with the addition of other means is deliberately used by Howard and Paret as they wanted to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. Ess entially, the intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continues throughout war into the subsequent peace. It could not be otherwise.Political relations between peoples and between their governments do not stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged. 14 . The German word Politik covers both policy and politics. Clausewitz did mean different things at different points. Sometimes the context suggests that he has foreign policy in mind, at others he highlights the social upheaval of the French Revolution and its consequence for warfare. 15 . Antulio Echevarria, War, Politics and the RMA The Legacy of Clausewitz, Joint Force Quarterly, 10 (winter 1995-6), 76-80. 16 . On War, VIII, 3B, p. 589 17 . Ibid. p. 586. 18 . Hew, S. , & Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Primacy of Policy and Trinity in Clausewitzs Thought. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clause witz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 74-90). New York Oxford University Press Inc. No modern translator is prepared to render wunderliche in the military context as wonderful or wonderous. Howard and Paret in 1976 used remarkable, which was a throwaway word of no particular significance. This was changed to paradoxical in the 1984 mutant, but this word seems to have no relationship to wunderliche and carries inappropriately negative connotations. 19 . On War, I, 1, 28. 20 . Ibid. Clausewitzs description of the trinity followed after the metaphor of war as a chameleon. 21 . Ibid. 22 . George Kennan formulated his original vision of containment more than sixty years ago. Although altered in its application by various administrations in the United States, it has in practice been incorporated within the concept and politics of common security, which in turn has itself been the essential complement to purely military containment. 23 . In comparison to the Cold War. 24 .Between glo balization on the one hand, and local struggles for identity and regional advantages and interests on the other between high-tech wars and combat with knives and machetes or attacks by suicide bombers between symmetrical and crooked warfare between wars over the world order, with the re-politicization and re-ideologization, between imperial-hegemonic dominance of the only superpower and the formation of new regional power centers between international organized crime and the institutionalization of regional and global communities and between increasing violations of international law and human rights on one side and their expansion on the other. 25 . Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Clausewitz and a New Containment. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. , Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 283-307). New York Oxford University Press Inc. 26 . Clausewitz discussed unlimited and limited war in terms that reinforcered his conception of the defense as the stronger form of war. The central issue in both cases of war was the will of the combatants. Unlimited war occurred when the attacker was determined to destroy the political independence of the defender through battle if necessary, and the defender no less determined to observe its political independence. Equivalence in the strength of will did not, however, mean the outcome would be determined by the balance of military forces and the fortunes of war.Even catastrophic military defeat at the hands of a militarily headmaster attacker, Clausewitz believed, would not produce a decision if the defender had the will to preserve what remained of his regular military forces by retreat even to the point of abandonment of all national territory, and to resort to armed popular support against the invader in spite of its potential to promote anarchy. Limited war meant a situation in which the attackers objectives did not involve the destruction of the political independence of the defender, and the defenders stake in the ou tcome was thus not one of survival. (Sumida, 2009) 27 . Andreas Herberg-Rothe had elaborated this interpretation in Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Das Ratsel Clausewitz. Politische Theorie des Krieges im WIderstreit (Munich, 2001), 79-145, and in the English edition of the same book, Clausewitzs Puzzle (Oxford, 2007).We can find this conclusion in the trinity within the note of 1827, in which Clausewitz mentioned both aspects as guiding principles for reworking the whole text in book I, chapter 2 and in most parts of book VIII of On War, 28 . On War, I, 2, pp. 91-2. 29 . Ibid. VIII, 3B, p. 585. 30 . It can be demonstrated that, due to systematic reasons but also with the respect to historical experience, trying to suspend this tension for the sake of the primacy of one of the two sides always leads to a primacy of the military means, of warfare and violence see Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London, 2002). 31 . Antulio, E. I. (2003). Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War. The European Legacy, 8/3, pp. 317-32. 32 .Ernst Otto Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch. Die pax Americana, der Terrorisinus und die Zukunft der interuationalen Bezh. hungen (Munchen, 2002). 33 . Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Clausewitz and a New Containment. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 283-307). New York Oxford University Press Inc. 34 . Antulio, E. (2009). Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 196-218). New York Oxford University Press Inc. 35 . Hammes, T. (2012, Spring). Offshore Control A Proposed Strategy. Infinity Journal, 2(2), pp. 10-14. 36 . Ibid. I, 1, 28, p. 89.